Anti-foundationalism and the vienna circle's revolution in philosophy

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (3):415-440 (1996)
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Abstract

The tendency to attribute foundationalist ambitions to the Vienna Circle has long obscured our view of its attempted revolution in philosophy. The present paper makes the case for a consistently epistemologically anti-foundationalist interpretation of all three of the Circle's main protagonists: Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath. Corresponding to the intellectual fault lines within the Circle, two ways of going about the radical reorientation of the pursuit of philosophy will then be distinguished and the contemporary potential of Carnap's and Neurath's project explored.

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Thomas Uebel
University of Manchester

References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Epistemology Naturalized.W. V. Quine - 1969 - In Willard Van Orman Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.
Testability and meaning.Rudolf Carnap - 1936 - Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.

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