The problem of common sensibles

Erkenntnis 66 (1):287 - 303 (2007)
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Abstract

In _On The Soul_ (425a-b), Aristotle drew a distinction between those qualities that are perceptible only via a single sense and those that are perceptible by more than one. The latter qualities he called

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10.1007/s10670-006-9035-9

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Citations of this work

Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Intermodal binding awareness.Casey O'Callaghan - 2014 - In David Bennett, David J. Bennett & Christopher Hill, Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. pp. 73-103.

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References found in this work

Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.
Individualism and psychology.Tyler Burge - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.

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