Absent qualia and the mind-body problem

Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168 (2006)
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Abstract

At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular _phenomenal_ consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no defi nition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative defi nition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the defi nition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is one that must be explained by means of specifi c examples and associated comments.

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Citations of this work

From P-Zombies to Substance Dualism.Perry Hendricks - 2024 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 31 (11):110-121.
Qualia.Michael Tye - 1997 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Zombies.Robert Kirk - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The inconceivability of zombies.Robert Kirk - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):73-89.

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.

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