Abstract

Can a constitution be treated as a recommendation rather than as binding and entrenched law? I argue that the answer to that question is Yes. With respect to the constitution in gross, that is, the total set of general provisions setting out both the structures of governance and the basic rights the constitution protects, the constitution as recommendation can serve as a focal point for ordinary political contestation which, because it unfolds in real time and is conducted by actors with limited time and energy for such contestation, occurs within (largely) settled institutional forms. With respect to the constitution in detail, that is, brought to ground in judicial judgments in contested cases, the answer is more complicated. Ordinarily treating judicial judgments as recommendations is a prescription for instability (and for that reason inconsistent with the idea of institutional settlement). If the target of such a judgment makes a considered judgment that instability is worth it, the target is raising questions about the continuing value of remaining in the particular polity within which the principle of institutional settlement holds sway.