Being in two minds: The divided mind in the ny yas tras

Asian Philosophy 9 (3):229 – 238 (1999)
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Abstract

In this paper I suggest that the division between manas and atman in Nyaya philosophy can be interpreted in the light of Western discussions about irrationality. In Western philosophy irrationality has been explained by postulating a divided mind. This helps to account for a generally rational mind that is nevertheless sometimes prone to irrationality. I argue that the division of the mind bears similarities to the division between manas and tman. Looking at the arguments of the Naiy yikas Gautama and V tsy yana for the existence of a permanent self, I do not find any of them convincing in the light of Buddhist criticism. However, by arguing for the division between manas and tman, the Naiy yikas have inadvertently provided their strongest argument for the existence of a self because they have managed to account for irrationality.

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References found in this work

Motivated irrationality.David Pears - 1984 - South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press.

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