Abstract

This article aims to evaluate the ontological implications of the thesis that the for-me-ness character is a universal feature of every experience. Kriegel & Zahavi claim that for-me-ness is what makes a mental state conscious, and that for-me-ness is a constitutive aspect of all conscious mentality. Here, I discuss the ontological assumptions implicit in this thesis and argue that while for-me-ness may be a universal feature of all experiences 1) It cannot be what makes a state conscious, given that the difference between the phenomenological and the subjective character ought to be conceptual 2) While the thesis maybe explanatorily vacuous, it is descriptively indispensable 3) For-me-ness does not underline the difference between conscious and unconscious mental states 4) It cannot ground theories about the diachronic unity of the self and, 5) It is non-anonymous. The main idea is that contrary to Kriegel & Zahavi’s claims, one can hold that the for-me-ness is a universal aspect of all conscious experiences, without holding that it constitutes and explains first-person ontology. The last section of the paper offers a thought experiment to support these claims.