Abstract

Since its formulation by Edmund Husserl, phenomenology has been regarded as a ‘method’. This is contested by Michel Henry, who speaks of the ‘question’ of phenomenology. This article traces Henry's objection to the classification of phenomenology as method, and considers both what he means by phenomenology being a question and what the answer to this question would be. To this end, the notions of ‘first givenness’ and ‘Life’ are explored, both of which are identified by Henry as being essential to phenomenality. The single answer to the question of phenomenology is ‘first givenness’ or ‘Life’, as both are identical. Christianity speaks of God as Life, which is frequently referred to by Henry. The theological interest in this topic is therefore the question of whether God is, in the end, Henry's answer to the question of phenomenology. This article explores the way in which Henry cites from the Bible and expresses theological notions. It concludes that the Christian articulation of God as Life, and its approach to truth, are essentially phenomenological. Thus, for Henry, ‘God’ is not the answer to the question of phenomenology, rather the Christian notion of God as Life indicates the correct phenomenological answer.