Merton-Popper’s paradox and the substantive rationality of science

Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 55 (2):49-52 (2018)
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Abstract

The author discusses the meaning of the paradox, which rises as a result of the controversy between the principles of scientific ethos (R. Merton) and fallibilism (K. Popper). She argues that the justification of the moral authority of science should not depend on this paradox. The author uses Max Weber’s concept of substantive rationality to consider the idea of social legitimation of science. She argues for understanding expertise as a special mode of scientific knowledge which aims at justifying the authority of science in the society.

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