Power Worlds and the Problem of Individuation

American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):269-282 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Is it metaphysically possible for a world to contain power properties but no nonpower properties? Recently, much progress has been made by powers theorists to defend the coherence of such a possibility. But unfortunately, it remains unclear how the powers in a power world are individuated. The problem is that the most obvious principle of individuation for properties in a power world is one that is circular. In this paper, it is argued that this circularity is generated by a modal assumption, which is that different families of powers exist in different possible worlds. By rejecting this assumption, a noncircular principle of individuation for power properties can be formulated. Moreover, this solution is not ad hoc because there are independent reasons for rejecting the aforementioned modal assumption.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,130

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-11-02

Downloads
64 (#330,036)

6 months
9 (#475,977)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Matthew Tugby
Durham University

References found in this work

Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties.Alexander Bird - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Scientific Essentialism.Brian Ellis - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Powers: A Study in Metaphysics.George Molnar - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephen Mumford.
Laws in nature.Stephen Mumford - 2004 - New York: Routledge.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1690 - Cleveland,: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by P. H. Nidditch.

View all 27 references / Add more references