Hans Kelsen’s and Robert Alexy’s Application Theories: Continuity or Disruption?

Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 107 (4):599-615 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article explores the common points and the differences between Hans Kelsen’s and Robert Alexy’s application theories. Although Kelsen subscribed to moral relativism and denied the idea of a practical reason, while Alexy criticised moral relativism and defended the idea of a communicative reason, it is argued that the two theories share important common features, such as denying that interpretation can point one single answer as the right one and acknowledging that interpretation is comprised by both knowledge and will. The article acknowledges that there are differences between both theories, analyses whether these differences are qualitative or quantitative and, in the end, concludes that between the two theories there is not disruption, as one might believe, but rather continuity.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,854

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Far Beyond from Norms, Distinguishing Rules and Principles.Julio Pinheiro Faro Homem de Siqueira - 2011 - Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 97 (2):198-206.
Why Kelsen’s Basic Norm Does not Include a Transition from Is to Ought.Matheus Pelegrino Da Silva - 2023 - Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 109 (2):231-245.
Merkls Beitrag zu Kelsens Theorie der Rechtsauslegung.Matheus Pelegrino Da Silva - 2019 - Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 105 (3):359-375.
Kelsen’s Metaethics.Paul Gragl - 2021 - Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 107 (4):549-567.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-11-10

Downloads
32 (#716,090)

6 months
9 (#519,282)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references