Abstract

This essay presents a theory of ethical action as heading out from non-uniform, bare cognitions of good or bad, right or wrong. It describes the path running from bare cognitions to rational ethical non-judgements and judgements, the latter of which may result in ethical either action or non-action. The concepts of ethical availability and judgements of opinion, or of mere morality, are introduced. The concept of moral facts is refuted. The reigning confusion between Ethics and Aesthetics is deprecated. Five laws ensue: No chain of agent-dependent ethical judgements can deliver ethical betterment; Moral utterances can be made sense of only de dicto, not de re, as they have no trans-world identity; Moral uncertainty is of the essence of Ethics; Afortioriness is the foundation of ethical betterment; The strengthening of features of character conduces to ethical betterment. Each is accompanied by commentary.