Abstract

In this paper, I focus upon two aspects of Adolf Grünbaum's discussion of space and time. First, I consider Grünbaum's rejection of intrinsic metrics in favor of extrinsic metrics, both in the case of space, and also in the case of time. Here I argue for the following three claims: (1) The idea of an extrinsic metric is open to very strong objections, both in the case of space, and in the case of time; (2) By contrast, there is no serious objection to the idea of an intrinsic metric, either in the case of space, or in the case of time; (3) There are good reasons for postulating an intrinsic metric, both in the case of space, and in the case of time. Secondly, I also consider Grünbaum's account of the nature of time, and here I argue for the following theses: (1) The argument that Grünbaum offers against accounts of the nature of time that postulate mind-independent tensed facts does not show that such accounts are unsound; (2) Grünbaum's claim that all tensed facts are mind-dependent is open to a serious objection; (3) Grünbaum's proposal that conceptualized awareness is an essential constituent of mind-dependent tensed facts is also very problematic.