Abstract

There are philosophers who deny that causal relations actually exist in nature, arguing that they are merely a product of our perspective as beings capable of intentional actions. In this paper I briefly explain this thesis and consider that it needs to be complemented with a basic non-causal ontological perspective whichcan account for phenomena taken as causal; I then describe what seems to be a good candidate for such an ontology and finally conclude, however, that it cannot dispense with the concept of causation and that therefore is not the kind of ontology that anti-realism about causal relations requires.Hay filósofos que niegan la existencia de relaciones causales en la naturaleza argumentando que no son sino producto de nuestra perspectiva como seres capaces de acciones intencionales. En este artículo expongo brevemente esta tesis y sostengo que debe contar con el complemento de una ontología no causal básica que dé razón de los fenómenos que se consideran causales. Luego describo lo que parece ser una buena candidata para tal ontología y concluyo que, sin embargo, ésta no puede prescindir del concepto de causalidad y que, por tanto, no es el tipo de ontología que necesita la mencionada tesis antirrealista respecto a la causalidad.