Abstract

The purpose of this essay is to indicate the extent to which there is a privileged relationship between the experience of the death of a friend and an understanding of what it means to be a self or a subject. In particular this claim is raised against Heidegger who in ¶47 of _Being and Time_ seems to have raised and explicitly denied any such connection but on closer review turns out to have in fact ignored it altogether. This essay aims to wrestle back from Heidegger the irreducible significance of an other’s death by casting light on a specific kind of intersubjectivity that Heidegger fails to consider: friendship. Drawing on the recently published course materials from Heidegger’s tenure in Freiburg, and in particular the 1921 lectures on Augustine’s _Confessions_, this essays points to a decisive turning point in Heidegger’s theory of Mitsein, if only by exposing a road not taken. The argument is that it is precisely because Heidegger, in fact, considers only the death of a “random stranger” rather than anybody that one actually cares for, that he has an easy time dismissing the significance of the death of another. Against Heidegger this essay will argue that when a friend dies one loses not only her friend’s presence but also something of her own. In so suggesting, this essay departs from the otherwise familiar critiques of Heidegger styled after Fichte, Hegel, or Levinas.