1. general constraints on a cognitivist account of intentions

In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Four. Oxford University Press. pp. 4--243 (2009)
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original Timmermann, Jens (2009) "1. Reason and its first 'Critique'". In Robertson, Simon, Spheres of reason: new essays in the philosophy of normativity, pp. 183: Oxford University Press (2009)

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John Skorupski
University of St. Andrews

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