Notes and Discussions: »The Subjective Element in Scientific Discovery: Popper versus ‘Traditional Epistemology'«

Dialectica 34 (2):155-160 (1980)
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Abstract

The explanation [of scientific change and problem solving] must, in the final analysis, be psychological or sociological. It must, that is, be a description of a value system, an ideology, together with an analysis of the institutions through which that system is transmitted and enforced. Thomas Kuhn Traditional epistemology with its concentration… on knowledge in the subjective sense, is irrelevant to the study of scientific knowledge. Karl Popper

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10.1111/dltc.1980.34.issue-2

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Paul Tibbetts
University of Dayton

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References found in this work

Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?T. S. Kuhn - 1970 - In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave, Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 22.
Evidence, Meaning and Conceptual Change: A Subjective Approach.Keith Lehrer - 1973 - In Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard, Conceptual change. Boston,: D. Reidel. pp. 94--122.

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