Two Problems of Direct Inference

Erkenntnis 76 (3):299-318 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The article begins by describing two longstanding problems associated with direct inference. One problem concerns the role of uninformative frequency statements in inferring probabilities by direct inference. A second problem concerns the role of frequency statements with gerrymandered reference classes. I show that past approaches to the problem associated with uninformative frequency statements yield the wrong conclusions in some cases. I propose a modification of Kyburg’s approach to the problem that yields the right conclusions. Past theories of direct inference have postponed treatment of the problem associated with gerrymandered reference classes by appealing to an unexplicated notion of projectability . I address the lacuna in past theories by introducing criteria for being a relevant statistic . The prescription that only relevant statistics play a role in direct inference corresponds to the sort of projectability constraints envisioned by past theories.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-09-18

Downloads
1,180 (#15,663)

6 months
196 (#16,209)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Paul D. Thorn
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf

Citations of this work

In Search for Optimal Methods: New Insights About Meta-Induction.Gerhard Schurz - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 54 (3):491-522.
Defeasible Conditionalization.Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.
An Argument for the Principle of Indifference and Against the Wide Interval View.John E. Wilcox - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):65-87.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1983 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
The theory of probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1949 - Berkeley,: University of California Press.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Philosophy 31 (118):268-269.

View all 37 references / Add more references