Abstract

In this thesis I argue that we need a philosophical approach to the subject of the burden of proof as it applies to cases of ordinary argumentation. I submit that the burden of proof is a conditional obligation to provide supporting grounds for an assertive speech act involving a constative, or fact stating or denying assertion, that a speaker incurs automatically when he performs an assertive speech act competently. ;I argue that this conditional obligation can be converted into an actual obligation to discharge the burden of proof by a hearer who has the power to impose a request for supporting grounds on any speaker who has placed himself in a position of probative liability by competently performing an assertive speech act in accordance with certain constitutive rules. This actual obligation is a duty that needs to be discharged ceteris paribus. ;I also maintain that this ceteris paribus condition involves issues that cannot be sorted out a priori by a systematic or theory oriented approach to the subject of the burden of proof. As a result, a rhetorical approach with its dedicated pursuit of context specific knowledge with which to analyse particular cases of argument seems to be the best complement to a speech act oriented approach to this subject. ;This thesis ends by advocating a mixed methodological approach that sees speech act theory as contributing to a systematic approach to the subject of the burden of proof as viewed from a general perspective and rhetorical theory as providing the impetus for incorporating the context specific knowledge needed to make an informed judgement about how the burden of proof ought to function in certain particular cases of argumentation. Consequently, this thesis presents itself as a modest proposal for an approach or outlook to the subject of the burden of proof for those who wish to take a philosophical approach to making such judgements