Abstract

Thomists need to learn from and address MacIntyre’s account of moral disagreement, whether or not they will ultimately agree with its broad outlines. First, they should consider that MacIntyre’s emphasis on social roles as an explanation of moral disagreement accounts for only some kinds of moral disagreement and growth. Second, a recognition of different kinds of disagreement shows that only some can be adequately addressed by moral philosophy, and even those that can be so addressed require not only instruction but also other forms of moral formation. Third, MacIntyre’s account of how some disagreements can be resolved through epistemological progress indicates that Thomists need to consider more carefully the connection between moral and scientific inquiry. I do not intend in this paper to present a full argument for the compatibility or incompatibility of MacIntyre with some version of Thomism, or for the correctness of his views. My purpose is to show that Thomists need to address these three areas more carefully, whether MacIntyre is ultimately correct or not.