Are Spectrum Arguments Defused by Vagueness?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (4):743-757 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

ABSTRACT I consider paradoxical spectrum arguments involving transitive relations like ‘better than’. I argue that, despite being formally different from sorites arguments, at least some spectrum arguments arise from vagueness, and that vagueness might often be the most natural diagnosis.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,290

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Spectrum arguments and hypersensitivity.Theron Pummer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1729-1744.
Diagnosing Sorites arguments.Robert Stalnaker - 2018 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 33 (3):509-520.
Sorites On What Matters.Theron Pummer - 2022 - In Jeff McMahan, Timothy Campbell, Ketan Ramakrishnan & Jimmy Goodrich (eds.), Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 498–523.
A note on the sorites paradox.Graham Priest - 1979 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):74 – 75.
Strict Finitism and the Happy Sorites.Ofra Magidor - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):471-491.
Vagueness And The Sorites Paradox.Kirk Ludwig & Greg Ray - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s16):419-461.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-01-30

Downloads
109 (#193,760)

6 months
15 (#194,860)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Teruji Thomas
Oxford University

Citations of this work

Multidimensional Adjectives.Justin D’Ambrosio & Brian Hedden - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (2):253-277.
On Evaluative Imprecision.Teruji Thomas - 2022 - In Jeff McMahan, Timothy Campbell, Ketan Ramakrishnan & Jimmy Goodrich (eds.), Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 478-497.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
General semantics.David K. Lewis - 1970 - Synthese 22 (1-2):18--67.
Totalism without Repugnance.Jacob M. Nebel - 2022 - In Jeff McMahan, Timothy Campbell, Ketan Ramakrishnan & Jimmy Goodrich (eds.), Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 200-231.

View all 29 references / Add more references