Abstract

Bernard Williams is universally recognised as one of the most important voices in 20th century moral and political philosophy. Yet his thought has only rarely been the subject of comprehensive analysis and interpretation: more often, attention has focused on his celebrated critiques of specific theoretical paradigms, such as the Kantian and the utilitarian ones. This book attempts to fill this gap. Considering Williams' work in its entirety, it reconstructs the particular and fascinating picture of moral philosophy that emerges from it. The ideal of ethical objectivity acts as a thread running through this reconstruction. More precisely, the basic question guiding the investigation is what remains of this ideal once Williams' critique of three fundamental ideas for moral philosophy has been sifted: that of normative theory, that of ethical knowledge and that of human nature (understood as a possible basis for objective ethical prescriptions). The answer, in a nutshell, is 'very little'. But this does not imply an abandonment to relativism. Rather, the answer implies the need to become aware of the historicity of our values and to re-examine them from a peculiar point of view, both historical and philosophical, in order to assess which ones deserve our trust. As suggested in this book, in the last years of his life Williams offered many useful insights for doing this.