Davidson and Quine's empiricism

Abstract

However, Davidson is not only skeptical towards the view that sensory stimulation provides the basis for meaning. He has also raised some doubts about the idea that such phenomena provide the basis for knowledge. For example, he rejects the idea that the acceptance of an observation sentence could somehow be justified by the stimulations that normally cause it. This in turn leads him to doubt the thesis that observation sentences have a privileged epistemological status; a thesis that is central to all forms of empiricism, Quine’s included.

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Folke Tersman
Uppsala University

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