Isis 93 (2):362-363 (
2002)
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Abstract
“The play's the thing,” according to Hamlet . Stephen Hilgartner agrees, and he has taken the notion of performance—public drama—and used it as an extended metaphor and analytical tool to explore ways in which scientific advice is generated, how advisory bodies seek to present themselves, and how they achieve credibility.Hilgartner focuses on three reports from the 1980s of the National Academy of Sciences that deal with diet and health. These were not typical reports, for they generated huge controversies that swirled around them. The reports' potential influence on doctors and patients, on the food and agriculture industries, and even on parents who admonish their children to drink their milk and eat their vegetables was also huge.Like most NAS products, the three reports were written by committees. The authors of the first one managed to fend off critics. The second was, to use Hilgartner's theatrical term, virtually “upstaged” by its critics. And the third was never published at all. The draft of this report, a 1985 study that dealt with recommended dietary allowances for foods, proved so disputatious that the effort was canceled by the president of the academy. All three cases are interesting and well presented, but the cancelled RDA report naturally has the most dramatic interest and is the most instructive.Credibility is the central issue in scientific advice. Even a body as august as the National Academy of Sciences cannot assume that its advice will be accepted at face value by policymakers, the public, or the scientific community itself. Hilgartner examines the techniques the academy used to enhance the credibility of its reports. These techniques included the literary structure of the publications as well as the maintenance of a sharp distinction between the “front stage” and “back stage” components of the advisory group's “performance.” Backstage, in the committee's deliberations, there may be sharp disagreements, but out front, the report is presented to the world as the product of consensus. Sometimes, however, these stage management techniques fail and internal dissension emerges into public view. Hilgartner's account of the saga of the RDA report illustrates how leaks and “unauthorized performances” effectively killed the report.Hilgartner carries the theatrical metaphor well beyond what one might expect in a scholarly book on science policy. In Chapter 4 he takes the academy's announcement canceling the 1985 RDA report and recasts it in explicitly dramatic form—a ten‐page script for a play entitled “A Letter from the Chairman: A Play in Three Acts,” complete with stage directions and a Greek chorus. Surprisingly, it works. While it may never be performed on Broadway, “A Letter from the Chairman” effectively makes Hilgartner's point. The episode illustrates how the academy, faced with a breakdown of its regular procedures, managed to portray the report's cancellation as “completely normal, … a logical consequence of the situation, not an aberration” .From my own standpoint as a political scientist, I might have liked a bit more emphasis on the interests the various committee members represented. Hilgartner acknowledges the roles vested interests play in the controversies that surrounded the three reports, but in maintaining his focus on information management by the academy, he fails to devote much attention to them. Similarly , he does not deal at all with a key category of scientific advice—that rendered privately by scientific advisors to policymakers.These are minor criticisms, however. On the whole this is an interesting and well‐written book that contributes a unique and valuable perspective to the literature on scientific advice given to the public