Explaining the rules

Philosophy 77 (4):597-613 (2002)
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Abstract

There is a class of speech-acts employing expressions such as ‘can't, ‘must’, and ‘meant to’, which have a paradigm role in stating the rules that govern a practice. Elizabeth Anscombe called such expressions stopping (or forcing) modals. Although “You can't phi”, etc., are not implicit hypothetical imperatives, it nevertheless makes prima facie sense to ask of a given practice why we go in for it, what the point of it is. Various questions are discussed in connection with these facts, e.g. What distinguishes a rule's applying to someone from its having force (for that person)? Where the practice at issue is a ‘language-game’, does the question “Why do we do this?” still makes sense?

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Roger Teichmann
Oxford University

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Aristotelian Necessity.Candace Vogler - 2020 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 87:101-110.
Authority.Roger Teichmann - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 54:229-243.

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