Abstract

Western analytic philosophers tend to confine themselves almost exclusively to a discussion of William James’s pragmatism, when thirty years ago John McDermott determined that the core of James’s metaphysics was actually radical empiricism. James, in fact, developed a tripartite metaphysics of pragmatism, pluralism, and radical empiricism, which constituted the actualization of his philosophical legacy inherited through Henry James Sr’s Swedenborgianism and Ralph Walled Emerson’s transcendentalism, both of which he opposed, which he tempered through his contacts with Charles Sanders Pierce, Chancy Wright, and others in the early years of the Metaphysical Club, until his own ideas began to come to maturity by the late 1890s. It is conjectured that, seeing as how James frequently built some of his major ideas by retailing the more cryptic philosophy of Peirce, the tripartite nature of James’s metaphysics was an attempt to model Peirce’s three categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. The international success of pragmatism, however, prevented James from articulating the full nature of his philosophy, which he tried to do in the closing decade of his life, but alas, he left us with only an unfinished arch. There is enough there, however, to state emphatically that if modern psychologists and philosophers persist in talking only about James’s pragmatism without reference to pluralism and radical empiricism, they are not really talking about William James.