Response to Comments

Review of Metaphysics 7 (4):689 - 693 (1954)
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Abstract

1. Professor Firth construes them as "resolutions or proposals," though I said nothing to indicate that they were so intended, and he gives no reason for so interpreting them. If one says, "some empirical beliefs are quite certain," he can be taken to be proposing a use for "certain," and if one says "grass is green," he can be understood as proposing a use for "green"; but neither is a natural interpretation.

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