A Contemporary Defense of the Aristotelean Distinction Between Essential and Non-Essential Attributes
Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook (
1982)
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Abstract
The distinction between the essential and non-essential attributes of material objects is one that can be traced back to Aristotle. It is the distinction between those attributes or things true of objects that need not be true of them in order for them to endure or persist and those attributes or things true of objects that must remain true of them as long as they can be said truly to exist. ;The claim that individuals themselves have essential and non-essential attributes is one that has been subject to much modern and contemporary criticism. In this work I have defended the distinction between essential and non-essential attributes against its contemporary opponents. Critics have maintained that upholding the distinction invariably leads to inconsistency, contradiction or nonsense. They have argued that whether or not an object has an attribute essentially or non-essentially depends, not upon the object itself, but upon human interests or conventions. Further, they have argued that whether or not an object has an attribute essentially or non-essentially would be relative to our conceptualizations of the object, to a specific language, to our interest in the object or to the way in which one referred to the object. ;In considering the logical objections aimed at upholding the distinction I have shown that the arguments that are purported to demonstrate that the essential/non-essential distinction can be maintained only at the cost of contradiction, inconsistency or nonsense are convincing only if one either fails to heed various distinctions that we, upon reflection, ordinarily make or acknowledge or is guilty of using certain terms equivocally, or else equivocates in the treatment of specific examples and analyses of certain sentences and statements. . . . UMI