Abstract

Panpsychism has recently emerged as a promising approach to addressing the hard problem of consciousness. This view posits that consciousness is both fundamental and ubiquitous. A recurring argument in its favour is the simplicity claim—that panpsychism is the simplest theory compared to its alternatives. However, the specific criteria for judging panpsychism as the simplest among competing theories remain underexplored by both its advocates and critics. This paper seeks to identify these criteria and assess the simplicity of panpsychism in relation to other metaphysical theories of consciousness. Through a comparative analysis, the paper argues that panpsychism is neither inherently simpler nor more complex than rival theories. The monistic version of panpsychism, for instance, entails a simpler ontological commitment than functionalism, the most widely accepted theory of consciousness. However, when ideological commitments are factored into the evaluation, even monistic panpsychism loses its purported simplicity advantage, let alone the dualistic versions of the theory.