Transparency and Partial Beliefs

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):153-166 (2016)
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Abstract

How should we account for self-knowledge of our inner lives? Some have argued that just as we have various senses that allow us to perceive the environment, we have an inner sense that allows us to perceive our inner lives. But others find such a view implausible and think that there are other ways to account for self-knowledge. With respect to all-or-nothing beliefs, some have held that we may account for self-knowledge by appealing to the claim that such beliefs are transparent--that we may answer the question 'Do you believe p?' by answering the question 'Is it the case that p?' But surprisingly, little or no attention has been paid to the question of whether partial beliefs are transparent. In this paper, I clarify the question of whether partial beliefs are transparent. I also consider various attempts to answer the question in the affirmative. To anticipate, my verdict is pessimistic: I argue that such attempts fail.

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Weng Hong Tang
National University of Singapore

Citations of this work

Pluralism about introspection.Kateryna Samoilova Franco - 2024 - Mind and Language (2):293-309.

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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.

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