Saving the distinctions: Distinctions as the epistemologically significant content of experience

In M. E. Reicher & J. C. Marek, Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (2004)
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Abstract

To account for a perceived distinction it is necessary to postulate a real distinction. Our process of experiencing the world is one of, mostly unconscious, interpretation of observed distinctions to provide us with a partial world-picture that is sufficient to guide action. The distinctions, themselves, are acorrigible (they do not have a truth value), directly perceived, structured, and capable of being interpreted. Interpreted experience is corrigible, representational and capable of guiding action. Since interpretation is carried out mostly unconsciously and in real time, the two aspects are present in experience together so that it is difficult to separate them out

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manuscript Collier, John (manuscript) "Saving the distinctions: Distinctions as the epistemologically significant content of experience".

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Author Profiles

Konrad Talmont-Kaminski
University of Bialystok
John Collier
University of KwaZulu-Natal

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