Das Recht auf unsinnige Entscheidungen: Kant gegen die neuen Paternalismen

Zeitschrift Für Rechtsphilosophie Neue Folge 1 (1):40-73 (2017)
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Abstract

In recent decades, behavioral sciences have introduced into economic theories of choice the image of weak willed individuals with limited rationality, whose decisions are affected by systematic errors. From here, theorists of libertarian paternalism originate the thesis of the possibility of State interventions that promote citizens’ welfare by conditioning their choices while, at the same time, safeguarding their freedom. The Author asserts that such a public promotion of individual welfare is equivalent to the transformation of the welfare State into a paternalistic State and that its theorists aim to avoid the debate about the conflict between exercising liberty and containing the public expenditure which is necessary to protect social rights

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