Abstract

Pre-reflectively, many addicts seem either not responsible, or less responsible, for their addictive conduct, at least if they lack responsibility for their addiction. Moore believes roughly the following. Addicts lack responsibility, when they do, because addicts are unable to control their conduct. They are unable when certain modal conditions are satisfied. Moore offers different modal conditions in different places. This view can be contrasted with another – that addicts lack responsibility when they do because they act on desires that are not well integrated into their motivations. Moore doubts the significance of integration for responsibility. I argue that addicts lack responsibility when, and because, first, addictive craving is not integrated into personhood in a way that directly grounds responsibility; and second, addicts lack the ability to control their addictive conduct to the extent needed for (full) responsibility. I explain how and why modal accounts of self-control need to be refined beyond ways Moore suggests to appropriately test the ability to control oneself, whether or not they are fundamental in explaining responsibility.