Moral Responsibility and Weakness of Will

In Responsibility and atonement. New York: Oxford University Press (1989)
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Abstract

Agents are praiseworthy for doing what they believe to be supererogatory, blameworthy for doing what they believe to be wrong. To have a belief that some action is morally good involves having some desire to do it. But we evince weakness of will when we yield to a stronger desire to do what we believe to be not the best action.

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