Fischer on Foreknowledge and Explanatory Dependence

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (4):51-61 (2017)
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Abstract

I explore several issues raised in John Martin Fischer’s Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will. First I discuss whether an approach to the problem of freedom and foreknowledge that appeals directly to the claim that God’s beliefs depend on the future is importantly different from Ockhamism. I suggest that this dependence approach has advantages over Ockhamism. I also argue that this approach gives us good reason to reject the claim that the past is fixed. Finally, I discuss Fischer’s proposal regarding God’s knowledge of future contingents. I suggest that it may be able to secure comprehensive foreknowledge.

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Philip Swenson
William & Mary

Citations of this work

Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Dependence: A Dialectical Intervention.Taylor W. Cyr & Andrew Law - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):145-154.
The Independence Solution to the Problem of Theological Fatalism.Ryan Wasserman - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):66-77.
The Frankfurt-style cases: extinguishing the flickers of freedom.John Martin Fischer - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (9):1185-1209.
Dependence and the Freedom to Do Otherwise.Taylor Cyr - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.
The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief.Richard Foley - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):111 - 124.
Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.
On Ockham’s Way Out.Alvin Plantinga - 1986 - Faith and Philosophy 3 (3):235-269.
Soft facts and ontological dependence.Patrick Todd - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):829-844.

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