Abstract

The question of political legitimacy is a question concerning the justification of coercive political institutions. We recognize an obligation to obey political institutions given the satisfaction of certain conditions, but the nature of these conditions is not always clear. This dissertation examines these conditions by investigating the models of political legitimacy proposed by the classic social contract authors Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Each model is first extracted from the general framework of the respective author's social and political theory and then critically evaluated. It is argued that Hobbes' justification of absolute government depends upon an inaccurate egoistic account of human nature, while Locke's model of political legitimacy over-emphasizes the importance of property rights. Rousseau's model is regarded as an improvement, but analysis reveals that he is unable to provide an adequate account of the presuppositions concerning human nature which he employs to justify political institutions. This failing involves the assumption that a natural justification of political relations is possible, and is seen to be indicative of the social contract tradition in general. Finally, the model of political legitimacy implicit in Rawls' "justice as fairness" is examined. This contemporary social contract model avoids some of the problems faced by the tradition, and ultimately re-focuses the contemporary question of political legitimacy in a more empirical direction