The Naturalism Question in Feminism

In Kelly James Clark, The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 49–60 (2015)
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Abstract

The subject of this chapter is to what extent a feminist should embrace naturalist commitments. I characterize naturalism as involving two commitments: a rejection of normativity and a commitment to philosophy as a descriptive discipline consisting of empirical questions to be answered by empirical methods. I argue that a feminist should not be a naturalist about normativity, because feminists need to engage in an inherently normative enquiry. On the other hand, a naturalist move, wherein one offers a causal explanation to undercut a normative claim, is an essential part of a good ideology critique, which is a feminist staple. As feminists believe that our lived experiences and social and material conditions are relevant to our theorizing, empirical questions should play an integral role in normative enquiry, but since philosophy is not exhausted by such empirical enquiry, philosophy isn't an empirical science.

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Ásta .
Duke University

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