Abstract

In philosophy one runs the risk of two kinds of criticism: that the answer one gives to a question is false or otherwise inadequate; or, perhaps worse, that the question one is trying to answer is itself misconceived. Carnap has directed a criticism of the second kind against traditional ontological disputes; the supposed issue between nominalists and realists is, according to him, devoid of cognitive content. This view is, of course, of a piece with Carnap’s general antipathy to metaphysical questions: nevertheless, Carnap employs some specific arguments against ontological questions in particular, and does not rely on standard verificationist arguments against metaphysics in general. My object in this paper will be mainly to get clear the issues raised by Carnap in ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’,’ in the hope that this will clear the way for a positive account of the status of ontological issues. In the final section I shall offer some- inevitably sketchy - suggestions towards such an account