On Imagism about Phenomenal Thought

Philosophical Review 119 (3):43-95 (2010)
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Abstract

Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is the view that there is some concept Q that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers. However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue.

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reprint Sundström, Pär (2011) "On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought". Philosophical Review 120(1):43-95

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Pär Sundström
Umeå University

Citations of this work

Knowing What It's Like.Andrew Y. Lee - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):187-209.
Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.

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