Abstract

Since its appearance in 1971, John Rawls’ A Theory of justice has attracted much critical attention. Most of this attention has inevitably centred on the two principles of justice for institutions and on their derivation from the original position. This paper will examine a part of the system which has not yet received such close scrutiny — Rawls’ theory of political obligation in general and civil disobedience in particular. My main aim is to understand this theory, since there are crucial respects in which it is undeveloped. But I shall also along the way comment on its possibilities; these comments will for the most part take the form of comparisons with its utilitarian rival.In what follows I shall not confine myself to the material in Rawls’ book, but rather use the appearance of the book as an opportunity to review the development of the theory of political obligation since “Justice as Fairness”. When one surveys the period bounded by that initial paper and by the book, certain patterns form.