Rationality and Higher-order Awareness

Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (1):78-98 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is argued that higher-order awareness is central to one type of everyday rationality. The author starts by specifying the target notion of rationality, contrasting it with other useful notions in the neighbourhood. It is then shown that the target notion relies on first-person awareness of the unfolding of cognition. This is used to explain the kernel of truth in epistemic conservatism, the structure of defeasibility, and the root motive behind the widely accepted distinction between rational inference and trivial entailment.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,173

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Pro tem rationality.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):383-403.
Subject, Object, and Knowledge as First-Person.Maria Rosa Antognazza - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (4):516-529.
Bridging Rationality and Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):633-657.
Higher-Order Defeat and Doxastic Resilience.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Dualism about undercutting defeat.Marco Tiozzo - 2024 - Ratio 37 (2-3):145-155.
Higher-order preferences and the master rationality motive.Keith E. Stanovich - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (1):111 – 127.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-05-21

Downloads
63 (#336,037)

6 months
7 (#699,353)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Scott Sturgeon
University of Birmingham

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Epistemic and the Zetetic.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):501-536.
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185–215.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Studia Logica 48 (2):260-261.
Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.

View all 11 references / Add more references