Confidence and Coarse-Grained Attitudes

Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3 (2010)
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original Sturgeon, Scott (2005) "Confidence and coarse-grained attitudes". In Gendler, Tamar Szabó, Hawthorne, John, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, pp. 3--126: Oxford University Press (2005)

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Scott Sturgeon
University of Birmingham

Citations of this work

Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making.James Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.
Friedman on suspended judgment.Michal Masny - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5009-5026.

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