Thinking as a function and its decomposition into a Taylor series

Философия И Культура 5:22-37 (2022)
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Abstract

The paper hypothesizes the possibility of applying the mathematical construction of the Taylor series in the semantic space. Then symbolic forms, like some spiritual functions that display the immanent in semantic space and are explicated in the form of verbal constructions, can be tried to decompose into a Taylor series. The first terms of the Taylor series of thinking functions carry basic meanings that are conjectured by secondary forms, tertiary, etc., as in the case of the usual Taylor series, where the first term of the series is a constant, the second term is linear, determined by the first derivative of the function, the third is quadratic, otherwise acceleration. The paper shows that all of the above can be found in the paradigms of thinking called Foucault epistems. The world in ancient philosophy seemed unchangeable or cyclical, which refers us to the concept of a constant or the first term of the Taylor series of the function of thinking. With the advent of Christianity, the circle of time turned into a straight line, the concept of evolution appeared. This stage was completed by Galileo, who introduced the idea of speed into the paradigm of thinking, which completed the formation of the second, linear term of the Taylor series of the thinking function. The third term of the series appeared in Newton's theory and entered the next episteme with the idea of acceleration. Deductively, one can continue the decomposition of the thinking function into a Taylor series and imagine the appearance of a member of the series responsible for the third derivative.

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