Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties

In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 310 (2013)
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Abstract

Some philosophers think that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties. In this paper, I argue that this entails that it is possible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I argue that Frank Jackson’s argument to show that this is possible fails, and that the objections to this argument show that it is impossible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I conclude that normative properties are not identical to descriptive properties. I then show that if we combine this conclusion with the conclusion of a different argument that Jackson has given to show that there are no irreducibly normative properties, it follows that there are no normative properties at all.

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Bart Streumer
University of Groningen

Citations of this work

Možemo li braniti teoriju normativne pogreške?Joshua Taccolini - 2024 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 20 (1):131-154.
Right-Making, Reference, and Reduction.Michael Byron - 2014 - Disputatio 6 (38):139-145.

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