Why counterpart theory and modal realism are incompatible

Analysis 69 (4):650-653 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I find a lost wallet containing the owner's address and a lot of cash. Shall I keep it or return it? Suppose I have the ‘liberty of indifference’: whatever I do, I could have done otherwise. Indeed, part of what is meant in saying I act freely is that either way what I do is up to me. And let's allow this liberty requires that my choice is not a logical consequence of the past and natural laws. If I return the wallet, I could have kept it without violating a law of nature or changing the past. Let's call this ‘situation S’ . Suppose I return the wallet.Others are also in S: free people find lost wallets every day. Each of us can freely return the wallet we find. It doesn’t follow immediately that we can all return it, however. That each ticket holder can win the lottery doesn’t entail they can all win it. We need the additional premiss that no number of people freely returning the wallet prevents the remainder from freely returning it. In short: each of us in S can freely return the wallet. Further, no number of us doing so prevents the remainder from doing so. Therefore it's possible that we all freely do what I do.According to Modal Realism , other possible worlds are concrete realities and the people in them as real as you and me. Some of these people are in S. Each of them can freely return the wallet; none of them is prevented from exercising that ability by others doing so, including others in worlds causally isolated from theirs. For instance, our doings in the actual world no more limit their abilities than ….

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,225

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Pascal's mugging.Nick Bostrom - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):443-445.
Corrective Justice and Property Rights: JULES L. COLEMAN.Jules L. Coleman - 1994 - Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (2):124-138.
Normality.Peter Alexander - 1973 - Philosophy 48 (184):137 - 151.
The Free Will Controversy.Louis De Bello - 1985 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
The Wrong Answer to an Improper Question?David Copp - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (sup1):97-130.
Ability and Being Able to Do Otherwise.Kadri Vihvelin - 1989 - Dissertation, Cornell University
The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.Peter Van Inwagen - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (3):185 - 199.
Possible girls.Neil Sinhababu - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):254–260.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-09-23

Downloads
226 (#114,278)

6 months
14 (#227,991)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jim Stone
University of New Orleans

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
The ersatz pluriverse.Theodore Sider - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (6):279-315.

Add more references