Abstract

The author starts from the hypothesis that it is essential for the countries of the region to critically assess the synergy established between systemic, political corruption and a selectively weak,?devious? nature of the state. Moreover, the key dilemma is whether the expanded practice of political rent seeking supports the conclusion that the root of all corruption is in the very existence of the state - particularly in excessive, selective and deforming state interventions and benefits that create a fertile ground for corruption? The author argues that the destructive combination of weak government and rampant political corruption is based on scattered state intervention, while also rule the parties cartel in the executive branch subordinate to parliament, the judiciary and the police. Corrupt exchange takes place with the absence of strong institutional framework and the precise rules of the political and electoral games, control of public finances and effective political and anti-monopoly legislation and practice included. Exit from the current situation can be seen in the realization of effective anti?corruption strategy that integrates preventive and repressive measures and activities and lead to the establishment of principles of good governance.