Kant's Criticism of Common Moral Rational Cognition

European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):85-108 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There is a consensus that Kant's aim in the Groundwork is to clarify, systematize and vindicate the common conception of morality. Philosophical theory hence serves a restorative function. It can strengthen agents' motivation, protect against self-deception and correct misunderstandings produced by uncritical moral theory. In this paper, I argue that Kant also corrects the common perspective and that Kant's Groundwork shows in which senses the common perspective, even considered apart from its propensity to self-deception and without being influenced by misleading theory, is deficient. Critical practical philosophy needs to set right agents about the stringency of some of their duties, and agents need to be made aware that they have certain other duties. I discuss how Kant corrects the common agent's notion of the stringency of the duty to not make false promises and how Kant corrects the common agent's notion of duties to self. I finally discuss how his critical practical philosophy can become popular and achieve the correction of the common perspective. I stress the role of education informed by philosophical theory for this and contrast it with so called ‘popular philosophy’.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,237

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-12-29

Downloads
93 (#233,218)

6 months
6 (#572,300)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Martin Sticker
University of Bristol

References found in this work

Kantian consequentialism.David Cummiskey - 1990 - Ethics 100 (3):586-615.
Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory.Jens Timmermann - 2013 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 95 (1):36-64.
Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason.Owen Ware - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
Kant on Conscience, “Indirect” Duty, and Moral Error.Jens Timmermann - 2006 - International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):293-308.

View all 21 references / Add more references