Spinoza’s Dynamic Theory of Mind in the 21st Century

Journal of Spinoza Studies 1 (1):111-120 (2022)
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Abstract

In this paper I maintain that Spinoza systematizes independently credible accounts of belief-formation, affect, and desire into an intriguing general theory of how the mind works. His account also explains disparate downstream psychological phenomena, including: (1) emotional responses to fiction; (2) belief perseverance; (3) the reduction of cognitive dissonance; (4) epistemic conservativism that opens us up to confirmation bias, identity protection, and intolerance. Given the promise of Spinoza’s program, I conclude with a plea for further philosophical engagement.

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Justin Steinberg
Cornell University

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References found in this work

Troubles with stereotypes for spinozan minds.Bryce Huebner - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (1):63-92.
How Mental Systems Believe.Daniel T. Gilbert - 1991 - American Psychologist 46 (2):107-119.
Belief, Affirmation, and the Doctrine of Conatus in Spinoza.Diane Steinberg - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):147-158.
Spinoza on the interaction of ideas : biased beliefs.Martin Lenz - 2019 - In Aurelia Armstrong, Keith Green & Andrea Sangiacomo (eds.), Spinoza and Relational Autonomy: Being with Others. Edinburgh: Eup. pp. 50-73.

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