Postulates of behaviorism

Philosophy of Science 20 (2):110-120 (1953)
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Abstract

We propose to take issue with a neo-behaviorist upon what might seem to be a minor detail, and about which we are sure that, upon reflection, he would not differ from us. It has to do with the use of the word experience in a basic postulate of behaviorism. Even if by a hair's breadth this implies something categorically different from behavior, then, it seems to us, the essential meaning of behaviorism has been missed.

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Citations of this work

Objectivism vs. subjectivism in the social sciences.Paul Diesing - 1966 - Philosophy of Science 33 (1/2):124-.

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References found in this work

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Handbook of Experimental Psychology.S. S. Stevens - 1953 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 15 (4):679-681.
Experience.B. A. Farrell - 1950 - Mind 59 (April):170-98.

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