Proper Names: Rigid Designation and the Causal Theory

Dissertation, Michigan State University (1981)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this essay an attempt is made to clarify and resolve some of the issues concerning proper names that have arisen as a result of Saul Kripke's now famous work, Naming and Necessity. More specifically, the main focus of attention will be the issues that arise in connection with Kripke's thesis that proper names are rigid designators and his thesis that proper names refer to their bearers in virtue of some appropriate causal connection. ;In chapter one I give a formally precise and rigorous account of Kripke's notion of a rigid designator by adopting the following definition. Where is any name or description, to say that is rigid is to say that the following condition holds: ; {E! x) {x= & x=)}} ; is then used to formally express Kripke's claim that proper names, unlike definite descriptions, are rigid designators, that is that proper names designate the same thing in every possible world in which they designate at all. Finally, in light of my account of a rigid designator I attempt to explicate and defend what I take to be Kripke's modal argument against the description theory of proper names. In particular I show that the argument has been misunderstood by various philosophers, and that the attempt to dodge it by viewing names as definite descriptions that have widest possible scope in modal contexts fails. ;Chapter two is devoted to critically examining a recent attempt by Michael Dummett to show that at least some proper names are on a par with definite descriptions in modal contexts, and hence are not rigid designators. ;In chapter three I attempt to show that the thesis that proper names are rigid designators is not coextensive with the thesis that proper names refer to their bearers in virtue of some appropriate causal connection. To accomplish this I construct a fairly clear and intuitive case of reference involving a proper name where there is no causal connection between the referent and the speaker's utterance of the name. Hence, if successful, I show that a causal theory of proper names cannot provide a necessary condition for name reference

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,388

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Causality, referring, and proper names.David S. Schwarz - 1978 - Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (2):225 - 233.
Proper Names and Relational Modality.Peter Pagin & Kathrin Gluer - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (5):507 - 535.
Names and Rigid Designation.Jason Stanley - 1997 - In Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller, A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 920–947.
Rigid Designation.Arthur Michael Sullivan - 1999 - Dissertation, Queen's University at Kingston (Canada)
Dummett and rigid designators.William C. Smith - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (1):93 - 103.
Rigidity and De Jure Rigidity.Mark Textor - 1998 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):45-59.
All Designators are Rigid.Harold Noonan - 2023 - Metaphysica 24 (1):101-107.
A Flaw in Kripke’s Modal Argument?Harold Noonan - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):841-846.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-04

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references