Abstract

This paper examines the problem of the construction of objects in natural sciences through the analysis of texts by Hans Reichenbach and Willard Quine. Particularly, it intends to show that scientific objects are not the result of an accurate representation of reality, but of theoretical reasoning based on experience. Although 20th century empiricism does not concede to rationalism the existence of a priori structures of knowledge, it does admit, from an apparently conventionalist point of view, the empirical underdetermination of theories and the diversity of possible interpretations of experience. The analysis of Quine’s view of ontological commitments and of Reichenbach’s view of quantum mechanics leads to considerations about de problem of ontology in natural sciences. Finally, the paper discusses to what extent this ontology can be described from an empiricist point of view. Key words: empiricism, ontology, Hans Reichenbach, Willard Quine, quantum mechanics.